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REGULATING ARMED PRIVATE MILITIA GATHERINGS: A
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INTRODUCTION
“Yesterday, in my view, was one of the darkest days in the history
of our nation.”1 President Joseph R. Biden spoke these words following the January 6, 2021 riots at the U.S. Capitol Building that
left five people, including a police officer, dead.2 The mob that
stormed the Capitol sought to prevent Congress from certifying
then-President-elect Biden’s Electoral College victory.3 In the weeks
following the riot, investigators began arresting rioters associated
with extremist right-wing militia groups, such as the Oath Keepers
and Three Percenters.4 While January 6, 2021, can accurately be
labeled a dark day in American history, the events that unfolded did
not necessarily surprise those familiar with the activity of extremist
private militia groups in the preceding months.
On October 8, 2020, federal agents arrested seven members of the
Wolverine Watchmen militia who plotted to kidnap Michigan
Governor Gretchen Whitmer.5 One week earlier, in front of a national audience, then-President Donald Trump told the Proud Boys,
a far-right extremist group, to “stand back and stand by.”6 In August
2020, seventeen-year-old Kyle Rittenhouse killed two protestors in
Kenosha, Wisconsin, where armed militia groups sought to assume
security functions during protests for racial justice.7 Although these
1. Joe Biden: Capitol Riots Were ‘Darkest Day’ in US History, BBC NEWS (Jan. 7, 2021),
https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-us-canada-55582016 [https://perma.cc/T6PS-2U5U].
2. See id.; Jack Healy, These Are the 5 People Who Died in the Capitol Riot, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 22, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/11/us/who-died-in-capitol-building-attack.
html [https://perma.cc/MV9M-EF9L].
3. Adam Goldman, Katie Benner & Alan Feuer, Investigators Eye Right-Wing Militias
at Capitol Riot, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 24, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/18/us/politics/
capitol-riot-militias.html [https://perma.cc/BLJ2-ZGFD].
4. Id.
5. Frank Witsil, Expert: Michigan ‘A Hotbed for Militia Activity,’ with Growing Potential
for Violence, DETROIT FREE PRESS (Oct. 8, 2020, 9:16 PM), https://www.freep.com/story/news/
local/michigan/2020/10/08/michigan-militia-wolverine-watchmen-gretchen-whitmer/5924
615002/ [https://perma.cc/92L7-JMRP].
6. Rachael Levy & Erin Ailworth, Who Are the Proud Boys? Canada Names Far-Right
Group a Terrorist Organization, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 5, 2021, 5:02 PM), https://www.wsj.com/
articles/who-are-proud-boys-11601485755?tesla=y [https://perma.cc/4ZY5-NJXG].
7. David Shortell, Christina Carrega & Josh Campbell, Vigilante Group Activity on the
Rise, Worrying Law Enforcement and Watchdog Groups, CNN (Aug. 30, 2020, 2:22 PM),
https://www.cnn.com/2020/08/30/politics/vigilante-group-activity-kenosha/index.html [https://
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incidents differ, they all highlight a troubling reality: the increased
presence of armed private militia groups in public spaces.8
While elements of private militias have existed since America’s
colonial period, the modern militia movement traces its roots to the
1990s.9 The movement, which is generally “anti-government and
radically pro-Second Amendment,” quieted in the early 2000s, but
has undergone a resurgence in recent years.10 Groups vary greatly
in ideology and activity, but three recent trends have emerged.
First, many groups have shifted from a strict anti-government
stance to open support for right-wing politicians.11 Second, militia
members have been emboldened by tacit support from politicians
and law enforcement, as demonstrated by the Proud Boys’ positive
reaction to then-President Trump’s comments.12 Third, armed
groups recently have appeared more regularly at peaceful protests,
particularly those dedicated to racial justice.13 As one analyst noted,
the militia movement has “normaliz[ed] the idea that vigilante
justice is not just justifiable but is necessary.”14
As demonstrated in Kenosha, as well as in Charlottesville,
Virginia, three years earlier, the presence of armed private militias
in public spaces can have deadly consequences.15 Of course, those
who go so far as to enact violence, fire a weapon, or take a life can
be prosecuted under various laws.16 However, all fifty states have at
least one additional statutory or constitutional provision that they
could use to regulate armed private militias.17 For example, some
perma.cc/BPF5-AK8V].
8. See id.; Witsil, supra note 5.
9. See Michael J. Golden, The Dormant Second Amendment: Exploring the Rise, Fall, and
Potential Resurrection of Independent State Militias, 21 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1021, 103031 (2013); Claire Hansen, The Problem with Militias and the Constitution, U.S. NEWS (Sept.
22, 2020), https://www.usnews.com/news/national-news/articles/2020-09-22/the-problem-withmilitias-and-the-constitution [https://perma.cc/D7VN-DKCH].
10. Hansen, supra note 9.
11. See id.
12. See Levy & Ailworth, supra note 6.
13. See Shortell et al., supra note 7.
14. Id.
15. See id.
16. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-280 (2021) (state statute proscribing willful discharge
of a firearm).
17. See INST. FOR CONST. ADVOC. & PROT., PROHIBITING PRIVATE ARMIES AT PUBLIC
RALLIES: A CATALOG OF RELEVANT STATE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 1 (3d
ed. 2020), https://www.law.georgetown.edu/icap/wp-content/uploads/sites/32/2018/04/Prohibit
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states criminalize paramilitary activity, such as instructing others
to use firearms or explosives knowing the weapons “will be unlawfully used in furtherance of a civil disorder.”18 Other laws regulate
gatherings of armed militia groups.19 States have failed to effectively use these provisions, likely due in part to a lack of precedent, a
lack of political will, and the limited penalties associated with a
conviction.20
Private militias have contested that these anti-militia laws are
unconstitutional. It is likely not merely coincidental that the resurgence of the private militia movement has overlapped with the
recent increase in Second Amendment jurisprudence.21 In 2008, in
the foundational case District of Columbia v. Heller, the Supreme
Court held that the Second Amendment protects an individual right
to possess a firearm for lawful purposes, such as protection in the
home.22 Two years later, the Court incorporated the Second Amendment right to bear arms to apply its protection to the states.23
Nevertheless, over the past decade, lower courts have repeatedly
upheld gun safety restrictions as constitutional public safety
measures.24 In fact, Virginia utilized its anti-militia laws in a successful suit that banned some groups from armed public gatherings
in Charlottesville following 2017’s violent “Unite the Right” rally.25
While laws preventing private militias from carrying firearms in
public may raise Second Amendment concerns, their application is

ing-Private-Armies-at-Public-Rallies.pdf [https://perma.cc/J5WM-RQNN] [hereinafter PROHIBITING PRIVATE ARMIES].
18. E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-9-120(2) (2021).
19. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 31-2-125 (2021).
20. See Alex Yablon, How to Neutralize a Militia, SLATE (Dec. 9, 2019, 7:34 PM), https://
slate.com/news-and-politics/2019/12/paramilitary-groups-anti-private-army-laws.html [https://
perma.cc/EE7H-MV3M].
21. See Hansen, supra note 9 (discussing gun lobbyists’ arguments that the Second
Amendment protects private militia activity).
22. 554 U.S. 570, 628-29 (2008).
23. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 791 (2010).
24. See Eric Tirschwell & Mark Frassetto, What the 2020 Supreme Court Term Means for
US Gun Laws, NAT’L L.J. (July 20, 2020, 3:15 PM), https://www.law.com/nationallawjournal/
2020/07/20/what-the-2020-supreme-court-term-means-for-us-gun-laws/ [https://perma.cc/
LEF7-XYUX].
25. PROHIBITING PRIVATE ARMIES, supra note 17, at 1.
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consistent with the courts’ understanding of the Amendment’s outer
limits.26
This Note argues that state laws that regulate private militia
groups are constitutional and not violative of the Second Amendment. To supplement this argument, this Note proposes that all
states should adopt the same standard to consistently regulate
armed militia gatherings in public spaces. This standard, modeled
on Alabama’s statute regulating unauthorized military organizations, would cover a variety of armed groups gathering at protests,
rallies, and public events.27 Additionally, this proposed law would
increase penalties for those convicted to enhance deterrence and
give the law more bite.28 The application of this standard across all
fifty states could de-escalate tensions, prevent violence, and save
lives.
To begin its analysis of laws regulating armed groups, this Note
must first define what constitutes a “private militia,” a term that
has taken on new meaning in recent years.29 Part I defines the term
and examines key differences between unofficial private militias
and state-sanctioned forces. Part I also traces the origins of militia
groups in America, from their colonial roots through the present
day, exploring some of the key features animating the modern movement. Part II examines recent Second Amendment jurisprudence to
analyze some of the theories that private militias draw on in arguing for their right to gather in public while armed.
Part III describes the existing provisions used to regulate armed
groups and examines their constitutionality under the Second
Amendment. Part IV then details this Note’s proposed standard, addressing practical challenges of implementation and responding to
anticipated counterarguments. Finally, a brief conclusion summarizes this Note’s argument and reexamines the current landscape

26. See, e.g., United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 471 (4th Cir. 2011) (“[A] lesser
showing is necessary with respect to laws that burden the right to keep and bear arms outside
of the home.”).
27. See ALA. CODE § 31-2-125 (2021).
28. Cf. Sara Rathod, Why the Law Turns a Blind Eye to Militias, MOTHER JONES (Oct.
25, 2016), https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2016/10/paramilitary-militia-laws-training/
[https://perma.cc/A9FT-CT57] (“[A]nti-paramilitary laws are often ignored because they have
few teeth.”).
29. See Hansen, supra note 9.
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for private militia groups. States have the tools at their disposal to
limit the negative influence of armed private militias. These laws
are constitutional, and states can, and should, use them to protect
communities.
I. DEFINING “PRIVATE MILITIAS” AND TRACING THEIR ORIGINS
One of the challenges of regulating armed private militia groups
is the lack of clarity regarding what constitutes a “private militia.”
No two groups are identical.30 However, regardless of the terminology used, private armed groups share common characteristics, often
utilizing similar themes and theories to support their actions.31
Private militias also trace their origins to a common colonial heritage.32 The concept of “the militia” changed significantly over time,
taking on a federal character in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.33 Nevertheless, by the late twentieth century, armed private
militia groups were appearing across the country.34 Section A seeks
to set out a workable definition of “private militia,” while Section
B tracks the development of the militia movement from colonial
forces fighting against British tyranny to today’s modern vigilante
extremists. Section B concludes by examining the recent increased
presence of armed groups in public spaces.
A. What Is a “Private Militia?”: Choosing a Workable Definition
Before applying “anti-militia” provisions, states must first define which groups fall under the laws’ prohibition. This task is
easier said than done, as evidenced by the variety of terms used to
refer to armed actors. Different groups have been labeled, or selfidentify, as “vigilante[s],”35 “paramilitary groups,”36 “antigovernment

30. Compare Witsil, supra note 5 (describing the Michigan Wolverine Watchmen militia
group), with Hansen, supra note 9 (describing the Three Percenters and Oath Keepers militia
groups).
31. See Hansen, supra note 9.
32. See Golden, supra note 9, at 1030-31.
33. See id. at 1032-37.
34. See Hansen, supra note 9.
35. Shortell et al., supra note 7.
36. Yablon, supra note 20.
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groups,” 37 “citizen militias,” 38 and “neomilitias.” 39 Some are also
characterized as “hate groups”40 or “far-right” extremists41 by experts and media commentators.
According to Merriam-Webster, a militia is “a part of the organized armed forces of a country liable to call only in emergency” or
“a body of citizens organized for military service.”42 Using these
definitions, most Americans might interpret the militia as statesponsored forces, such as the National Guard.43 In District of Columbia v. Heller, much of Justice Scalia’s analysis focused on how
the Second Amendment’s “well regulated Militia” language should
be interpreted.44 Rather than restrict the term to the “organized
militia,” Justice Scalia interpreted “militia” to include “all ablebodied men.”45 This definition was essential to the Court’s holding
that the Second Amendment includes an individual right to bear
arms for lawful purposes, regardless of affiliation with a formal
militia.46 Thus, while the dictionary definition of “militia” may be
limited to official forces, the legal definition includes any ablebodied individual.
Private militia members have seized on the Heller holding to
argue for their right to bear arms in public.47 Interestingly, Merriam-Webster includes another definition for “militia”: “a private
group of armed individuals that operates as a paramilitary force and
is typically motivated by a political or religious ideology.”48 This
37. Antigovernment Movement, S. POVERTY L. CTR., https://www.splcenter.org/fightinghate/extremist-files/ideology/antigovernment [https://perma.cc/BD7D-6D2G].
38. R.J. Larizza, Comment, Paranoia, Patriotism, and the Citizen Militia Movement:
Constitutional Right or Criminal Conduct?, 47 MERCER L. REV. 581, 582-83 (1996).
39. Brannon P. Denning & Glenn Harlan Reynolds, It Takes a Militia: A Communitarian
Case for Compulsory Arms Bearing, 5 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 185, 187-89 (1996).
40. Rathod, supra note 28.
41. Levy & Ailworth, supra note 6.
42. Militia, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/militia
[https://perma.cc/4ULX-5WVU].
43. See JOSEPH BLOCHER & DARRELL A. H. MILLER, THE POSITIVE SECOND AMENDMENT:
RIGHTS, REGULATION, AND THE FUTURE OF HELLER 22-23 (2018) (discussing the federalization
of state militias under the National Guard).
44. 554 U.S. 570, 595-97 (2008).
45. Id. at 596.
46. See id. at 628-29. For further analysis of the Court’s holding and Justice Scalia’s
reasoning in Heller, see infra Part II.A.
47. See infra Parts I.B, II.C.
48. Militia, supra note 42.
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definition could accurately be used to describe many modern groups.
However, because this Note analyzes and advocates for state antimilitia laws, it will adopt the legal language used in existing state
provisions. For the purposes of this Note, a private militia is “[a]ny
two or more persons, whether with or without uniform, who associate, assemble, or congregate together by or under any name in
a military capacity ... or otherwise take up or bear arms in any such
capacity without authority of the Governor.”49 As discussed below,
this definition encompasses various groups, providing states wide
latitude to regulate armed actors.50 Ultimately, it is not a group’s
ideology or beliefs that are cause for concern; rather, the proliferation of dangerous weapons, the escalation of tensions, and the
potential for violence in public spaces demand regulation.51
B. How Did We Get Here?: The Origins of Modern Private Militias
Militia groups can trace their origins back to the English common
law. Prior to the 1600s, “criminal justice was reliant upon the private citizen.”52 In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, citizens
began to organize and operate as “thief-catchers” and community
watch groups.53 Eventually, militias formed to serve as a check on
the monarchy.54 British citizens perceived militia membership as a
fundamental individual right.55 This important conception crossed
the Atlantic, and colonists would later advocate the militia’s antityranny purpose in their fight for independence.56 Prior to the
Constitution, militias flexibly served the needs of their communities.57
49. ALA. CODE § 31-2-125 (2021).
50. See infra Part IV.
51. See Shortell et al., supra note 7.
52. See Jessica Conaway, Comment, Reversion Back to a State of Nature in the United
States Southern Borderlands: A Look at Potential Causes of Action to Curb Vigilante Activity
on the United States/Mexico Border, 56 MERCER L. REV. 1419, 1430-31 (2005).
53. Id. at 1431.
54. Joelle E. Polesky, Comment, The Rise of Private Militia: A First and Second
Amendment Analysis of the Right to Organize and the Right to Train, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1593,
1597 (1996).
55. Id. at 1598.
56. See id.
57. Golden, supra note 9, at 1030-31.
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However, as the new nation moved into the nineteenth century,
the militia became more formalized and structured. As cities and
populations expanded, “public law enforcement was born.”58 The
First Militia Act of 1792 enumerated federal authority to call state
militia forces.59 Later, the First Dick Act of 1903 and the Second
Dick Act of 1908 created the federal “organized militia”—the National Guard—and allowed the President to determine the length
and location of militia service, respectively.60 The National Defense
Act of 1916 then gave the national government “near complete
control of state militias.”61 Today, for the most part, official militia
service is co-opted, run, and regulated at the federal level.62
While the official militia became increasingly federalized throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, private actors continued
to take the law into their own hands. Citizen’s arrest laws have
allowed private actors to arrest those who have committed a crime
when police are not present.63 Hate groups, most notably the Ku
Klux Klan, took the law into their own hands in forming lynch mobs
to carry out extrajudicial killings or threaten violence against minority groups.64 Even the Black Panthers might be considered a private militia, as the group openly advocated for carrying arms for
collective self-defense.65
“[T]he modern militia movement” rose to national prominence
in the 1990s following “government standoffs [with armed groups]
at Ruby Ridge, Idaho, and Waco, Texas.”66 This anti-government
strain appeared to wane during the George W. Bush administration,
but rapidly increased during President Barack Obama’s two terms,
with the Southern Poverty Law Center identifying at least 1,360
58. Conaway, supra note 52, at 1431.
59. Act of May 2, 1792, ch. 28, § 1, 1 Stat. 264, 264.
60. Act of Jan. 21, 1903, ch. 196, § 1, 32 Stat. 775, 775; Act of May 27, 1908, ch. 204, § 4,
35 Stat. 399, 400.
61. Golden, supra note 9, at 1035-36; National Defense Act, ch. 134, 39 Stat. 166 (1916).
62. See Golden, supra note 9, at 1037.
63. See Frances Robles, The Citizen’s Arrest Law Cited in Arbery’s Killing Dates Back to
the Civil War, N.Y. TIMES (May 13, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/article/ahmaud-arberycitizen-arrest-law-georgia.html [https://perma.cc/C89Y-VCP6].
64. See, e.g., Vietnamese Fishermen’s Ass’n v. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, 543 F. Supp.
198, 206-07 (S.D. Tex. 1982).
65. See Luke Morgan, Note, Leave Your Guns at Home: The Constitutionality of a
Prohibition on Carrying Firearms at Political Demonstrations, 68 DUKE L.J. 175, 181 (2018).
66. See Hansen, supra note 9.
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“anti-government Patriot” groups in 2012 alone.67 Many analysts
view the election of Donald Trump as a turning point for several
militia groups.68 Rather than maintaining a strict anti-government
stance, many armed groups began to identify with fringe right-wing
politicians.69 While private militias differ greatly in their makeup
and beliefs, the overlap between some vocal groups and nationalist,
extremist, or white supremacist views raises alarms.70
The greatest threat posed by private militias occurs when they
appear armed at public gatherings.71 When armed—mostly white—
groups appear for “protection” and “self-defense” at protests for racial justice, escalated tensions and violence often follow.72 Arguing
that they are protecting property and local communities, private militias have used theories of self-defense, as well as favorable “stand
your ground” and citizen’s arrest laws, to justify carrying assault
rifles and other weapons.73 Framing their actions as self-defense or
defense of others, these armed actors sometimes take the law into
their own hands with tragic results, as highlighted by the killings
in Kenosha.74 Although private militias can vary greatly in their
views and activity levels, all groups, to some degree, cite the Second
Amendment as providing them with a right to bear arms in public.75
Thus, prior to analyzing the laws currently used to regulate private
militias, it is critical to examine Second Amendment jurisprudence
to understand the theories underpinning these groups’ interpretations of their right to bear arms.
67. Active ‘Patriot’ Groups in the United States in 2012, S. POVERTY L. CTR. (Mar. 1, 2013),
https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/intelligence-report/2013/active-%E2%80%98patriot%E
2%80%99-groups-united-states-2012 [https://perma.cc/T485-Z2DC]; see also Hansen, supra
note 9.
68. See Hansen, supra note 9.
69. See id.
70. See id.
71. See Shortell et al., supra note 7.
72. See id; see also Mara Hvistendahl & Alleen Brown, Armed Vigilantes Antagonizing
Protesters Have Received a Warm Reception from Police, THE INTERCEPT (June 19, 2020, 1:55
PM), https://theintercept.com/2020/06/19/militia-vigilantes-police-brutality-protests/ [https://
perma.cc/X3MK-WEQ9] (noting “nearly 200 appearances by vigilantes and far-right extremists at protests” for racial justice in the weeks following George Floyd’s death).
73. See, e.g., Shortell et al., supra note 7. While an analysis of “stand your ground” and
citizen’s arrest laws is beyond the scope of this Note, it is worth pointing out the theoretical
overlap between these laws and private militias’ justifications for arming themselves.
74. See id.
75. See Hansen, supra note 9.
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II. ROOTING THE SECOND AMENDMENT IN HISTORY AND THEORY
In District of Columbia v. Heller, the Supreme Court fundamentally altered conceptions of the Second Amendment. Prior to Heller,
the dominant reading of the Amendment limited the right to bear
arms to people associated with the militia.76 This view “prevailed for
more than two centuries,” with nearly all challenges to the Amendment dismissed because the claimant had no connection to the
formal militia.77 However, in Heller the Court interpreted the right
to bear arms as a fundamental individual right.78 Nevertheless,
courts received little guidance from Heller regarding the scope of
this individual right.79 Since Heller, gun rights activists, including
private militias, have used Heller’s interpretation to call for the
repeal of gun control laws.80 Courts have been reluctant to expand
the right beyond Heller, with the Supreme Court also denying challenges to gun safety measures.81
Section A discusses the Court’s reasoning in Heller, with a focus
on the historical and textual analysis undertaken by Justice Scalia.
Section B examines several post-Heller cases to explore how most
courts have interpreted and applied the Second Amendment’s individual right to bear arms. Finally, Section C analyzes theories of the
Second Amendment that private militia groups have drawn upon to
justify their actions.
A. District of Columbia v. Heller: Defining the Individual Right to
Keep and Bear Arms
In Heller, the respondent was a special police officer who was
denied a license to register a handgun that he wished to keep in
his home.82 Heller brought suit against the District of Columbia,
challenging the constitutionality of the District’s prohibition on
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

See BLOCHER & MILLER, supra note 43, at 59.
Id.
See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628-29 (2008).
See BLOCHER & MILLER, supra note 43, at 61.
See Tirschwell & Frassetto, supra note 24.
See id.
554 U.S. at 575.
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registering handguns.83 The Supreme Court granted certiorari after
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed
the district court’s dismissal of Heller’s complaint.84 Utilizing an
originalist approach, Justice Scalia focused on the text and history
of the Second Amendment in authoring the majority opinion.85
Justice Scalia began his analysis of the Amendment’s text by
examining its two clauses: (1) the prefatory clause, the portion
reading, “[a] well-regulated Militia, being necessary to the security
of a free State”; and (2) the operative clause, which states, “the right
of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”86 The
prefatory clause, while “clarifying,” did not “limit or expand the
scope of the operative clause.”87 Thus, Justice Scalia emphasized
that, while the drafters viewed the militia as worthy of protection,
an individual right to keep and bear arms lies at the core of the
Amendment.88 Analogizing to similar language in other Amendments, Justice Scalia interpreted “the people” to “unambiguously
refer to individual rights.”89 Additionally, relying on historical records, commentary, and textual analysis, the opinion took the phrase
“to keep and bear arms” to mean simply to possess and carry
weapons “in common use” and the word “militia” to mean “all ablebodied men.”90 Finally, the “free State” language did not mean the
individual American states, but rather any “free polity” or society.91
Having conducted a textual and historical analysis of the Amendment, the Court held the ban on handgun registration to be an
unconstitutional violation of the individual right to bear arms.92 A
few takeaways from the Court’s opinion are noteworthy. First, the
Court held that the Second Amendment protects possession of a
firearm for a “lawful purpose,” such as self-defense in one’s home.93
This language—as well as what the Court did not say about the
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Id. at 575-76.
Id. at 576.
See generally id. at 576-628.
Id. at 576-78.
Id. at 578.
Id. at 595.
Id. at 579.
Id. at 596, 622, 627.
Id. at 597.
Id. at 628-29.
Id.
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scope of the right beyond the home—would prove significant to postHeller analysis and theories advocated by private militias.94 Second,
while this specific law did not pass constitutional muster, Justice
Scalia recognized that gun regulation is allowed, noting some examples, such as restrictions on possession by felons and the mentally ill or limits on carrying weapons in “sensitive places.”95 Finally,
although Heller clarified Second Amendment protection for an individual right to keep and bear arms, the opinion left many questions unanswered for future cases.96 Some of these questions have
arisen in subsequent litigation, with many yet to be answered as
Heller transitions into its second decade.97
The Heller dissents help to fill out the larger debate surrounding
the Second Amendment. In his dissent, Justice Stevens, joined by
Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, and Souter, also used history and text to
argue that the Amendment’s scope should be limited to “certain
military purposes.”98 Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Stevens,
Ginsburg, and Souter, argued in his dissent that the individual
right to bear arms must be balanced against public interests.99
Furthermore, Justice Breyer argued for deference to the political
branches, criticizing the Court for engaging in judicial overreach.100
Taken together, the Heller majority and dissents recognized that the
right to bear arms does not prevent regulation.101 As the next
Section addresses, where the line should be drawn on restrictions
remained to be answered in subsequent litigation and debated
among experts and activists.

94. See infra Part II.B-C.
95. Heller, 554 U.S. at 626-27.
96. See BLOCHER & MILLER, supra note 43, at 77.
97. Id. at 90.
98. Heller, 554 U.S. at 637 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Miller, 307
U.S. 174, 178 (1939)).
99. Id. at 689 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
100. Id. at 719; see also BLOCHER & MILLER, supra note 43, at 81.
101. See BLOCHER & MILLER, supra note 43, at 73.
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B. “A Vast Terra Incognita”: The Scope of the Second Amendment
After Heller
Following Heller, judges were left with a “vast terra incognita,”
uncertain how far to venture into uncharted territory.102 Although
Heller clarified that the Second Amendment protects an individual
right to bear arms, the Court’s holding did little to explain what
that right encompasses.103 In his Heller dissent, Justice Stevens
wrote, “that the Second Amendment protects an individual right
does not tell us anything about the scope of that right.”104 Left with
minimal guidance, lower courts have been forced to determine
whether the Amendment applies to a given challenge and, if so,
what level of scrutiny is proper.
In 2010, the Supreme Court issued some minor guidance in
McDonald v. City of Chicago, holding that the individual right to
bear arms applied equally to the states and federal government.105
In that case, Otis McDonald challenged a Chicago ordinance that
“effectively bann[ed] handgun possession by almost all private citizens.”106 The Court held that the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment incorporated the Second Amendment,
thereby protecting an individual’s right to bear arms for lawful
purposes.107 In its holding, the Court noted that Heller protected
the right to bear handguns “in the home for the purpose of selfdefense.”108 Thus, although McDonald extended the right to the
states, the holding did little to clarify the scope of that right beyond
in-home defense.109
Heller and McDonald left important questions unanswered.110
What kinds of weapons are protected? Under what circumstances?
United States v. Masciandaro was among the first of over one
thousand Second Amendment challenges that flooded the courts

102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 475 (4th Cir. 2011).
See BLOCHER & MILLER, supra note 43, at 102.
Heller, 554 U.S. at 636 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
561 U.S. 742, 791 (2010).
Id. at 750.
Id. at 791.
Id.
See BLOCHER & MILLER, supra note 43, at 97.
Id. at 101.
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post-Heller.111 In that case, Sean Masciandaro was arrested when
he was found in possession of a handgun after falling asleep in his
car at Daingerfield Island near Alexandria, Virginia.112 The area
was operated by the National Park Service, which banned carrying
handguns in a vehicle on park land.113 According to the Fourth
Circuit, Masciandaro’s challenge of the regulation fell short, since
the government could demonstrate that the restriction was “reasonably adapted to a substantial government interest”—public
safety.114 Crucially, the court noted that while strict scrutiny is
“important to protect the core right of the self-defense of a lawabiding citizen in his home,” a lesser standard of scrutiny can apply
to the right outside of the home.115 Thus, even if Masciandaro’s
possession was covered by the Second Amendment, the government
could still ban carrying guns in the park if it could show the law was
tailored to a substantial interest.116
Another Fourth Circuit case, Kolbe v. Hogan, highlights the
developing post-Heller Second Amendment analysis.117 In that case,
the plaintiffs challenged Maryland’s prohibitions on assault weapons and large-capacity magazines.118 Relying on the “M-16 rifles
and the like” language in Heller,119 the Fourth Circuit held that,
regardless of their popularity, assault weapons are “most useful in
military service” and therefore not protected by the Second Amendment.120 As it did in Masciandaro, the Fourth Circuit noted that its
holding did not alter Heller’s protection of the right to lawfully possess a handgun in the home for self-defense.121 However, even if assault weapons and large-capacity magazines were considered part
of the protected Second Amendment right, Maryland’s prohibitions

111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Id. at 101.
United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 460 (4th Cir. 2011).
Id. (citing 36 C.F.R. § 2.4(b) (2009)).
Id. at 471.
Id.
See BLOCHER & MILLER, supra note 43, at 108-09.
See 849 F.3d 114, 120-21 (4th Cir. 2017).
Id. at 120.
554 U.S. 570, 627 (2008).
Kolbe, 849 F.3d at 144.
Id.
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would survive intermediate scrutiny due to the government’s substantial interest in public safety.122
Left with little guidance and many unanswered questions from
Heller, lower courts have been reluctant to expand the scope of the
Second Amendment’s individual right to keep and bear arms. The
federal circuits have largely adopted the two-part approach applied
in Masciandaro and Kolbe.123 First, courts must determine whether
the law burdens conduct covered by the Second Amendment.124 This
analysis begins with the uncovered categories enumerated in
Heller—possession by felons or the mentally ill, possession in sensitive places, and arms not in “common use” or not “typically
possessed by law-abiding citizens.”125 Courts also draw on “precedent, history, and tradition” to determine whether conduct is covered.126 Second, if the law indeed burdens covered conduct, courts
must then apply the appropriate level of judicial scrutiny—intermediate scrutiny for non-core conduct and strict scrutiny for core
exercises.127 As exhibited by Heller, possession of a handgun for selfdefense in the home is a core exercise, requiring strict scrutiny.128 In
contrast, in both Kolbe and Masciandaro, the Fourth Circuit held
that the respective laws were reasonably adapted to the substantial
government interest in public safety, thereby satisfying the lower
standard of intermediate scrutiny.129
Despite the countless Second Amendment challenges raised in the
decade following Heller, little has changed in terms of the scope of
the individual right to bear arms. Courts have widely adopted the
two-part approach, with intermediate scrutiny applied “[f]requently, although not universally,” in determining that laws are substantially related to important government interests, namely public
safety.130 A minority of judges would look to text, history, and
122. Id. at 146.
123. See id.
124. Id.
125. 554 U.S. 570, 625-27 (2008).
126. BLOCHER & MILLER, supra note 43, at 110.
127. See Kolbe, 849 F.3d at 133-34.
128. See 554 U.S. at 628-29.
129. Kolbe, 849 F.3d at 146; United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 471 (4th Cir.
2011).
130. BLOCHER & MILLER, supra note 43, at 110. Some critics argue that tiered scrutiny
produces uncertain and inconsistent results. See, e.g., Sam Zuidema, Note, Raising Heller:
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tradition to determine whether a given law violates the Amendment.131
Nevertheless, the two-part approach appears to be the law of the
land in the post-Heller world, as the Supreme Court has declined
repeated efforts to hear Second Amendment challenges.132 In May
2020, the Court declined to rule on the merits of New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. City of New York.133 A month later, the Court
declined to hear ten other petitions challenging gun regulations.134
However, following the death of Justice Ginsburg, the Court features a majority likely more favorable to expansion of the individual
right to bear arms.135 In its upcoming term, the Court will decide
New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, its first major Second
Amendment case since McDonald over a decade ago.136 The challenged New York law requires an individual to demonstrate an “actual and articulable” need to carry a concealed handgun in public.137
If the Court were to find the law unconstitutional, the decision
would signal an expanded scope for the Second Amendment right
and significantly impact states with restrictions on concealed and
open carry.138 While change may be coming in the near future, for
now the Court appears to recognize the merits of the existing Second Amendment framework, allowing lower courts to uphold gun
safety laws in most challenges.139

Constitutional Scrutiny in a New Age of Second Amendment Rights, 2018 U. ILL. L. REV. 813,
845-46.
131. See Darrell A. H. Miller, Text, History, and Tradition: What the Seventh Amendment
Can Teach Us About the Second, 122 YALE L.J. 852, 895-96 (2012).
132. See Tirschwell & Frassetto, supra note 24.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. See Kevin Johnson, Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s Death Injects New Urgency into Second
Amendment Debate Amid Supreme Court Battle, USA TODAY (Sept. 21, 2020, 6:14 PM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2020/09/21/ruth-bader-ginsburgs-death-injectsurgency-into-2nd-amendment-debate/5851563002/ [https://perma.cc/U6ED-UUY5].
136. See Ariane de Vogue & Devan Cole, Supreme Court Agrees to Take up Major Second
Amendment Case, CNN (Apr. 26, 2021, 11:21 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2021/04/26/politics/
supreme-court-second-amendment-case/index.html [https://perma.cc/VL4R-2AQU].
137. Id.
138. See id.
139. See Tirschwell & Frassetto, supra note 24.
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C. Theories of the Second Amendment: How Private Militias
Argue for the Right to be Armed in Public
Within this post-Heller landscape, parties have taken up sides in
the debate on gun control. On one end of the spectrum are those who
believe the Second Amendment protects only use by military forces,
while at the other end are those who believe there should not be any
weapons regulations.140 Most people fall between these poles, as
some agree with only the Heller right to possess a handgun for selfdefense in the home while others argue for a more expansive scope
allowing for the possession of most firearms—including assault
rifles—in or out of the home.141 Depending on the group, private
militias fall either into the latter category or at the extreme pole
opposing any gun regulations, arguing that the Second Amendment
protects their members’ rights to be armed in public.142 As Second
Amendment scholars Joseph Blocher and Darrell A. H. Miller note,
“the Court’s decision [in Heller] is hard to reconcile with any particular theory of the Second Amendment.”143 No one theory can fully
explain the right to keep and bear arms. Nevertheless, this Section
identifies some of the main justifications articulated by armed private militias.
1. Self-Defense
As Heller makes clear, “‘[s]elf-defense’ is the starting place for
any Second Amendment theory.”144 Justice Scalia’s opinion emphasized self-defense as “the core lawful purpose” of the right to bear
arms.145 However, uncertainty about what constitutes self-defense

140. See Daniel J. Wright, The Orphaned Right: How a San Diego Resident Might Have
Saved Second Amendment Liberty—Peruta v. California, 137 S. Ct. 1995 (2017), 32 REGENT
U. L. REV. 387, 389-90 (2020).
141. See id. at 389.
142. The ongoing state of the gun control debate is beyond the scope of this Note, but it is
important to note the positions taken by private militias and how these stances are influenced
by the specific theories articulated by armed groups.
143. BLOCHER & MILLER, supra note 43, at 170.
144. Id. at 152.
145. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 630 (2008).
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has troubled courts.146 “[T]he traditional legal understanding of
self-defense” differs significantly from the term’s definition in everyday use.147 Second Amendment scholar Eric Ruben proposes that
the limitations of legal self-defense—such as requirements of necessity and proportionality, as well as the role of self-defense as an
affirmative defense to criminal charges—should inform any understanding of the Second Amendment doctrine.148 The theory of
self-defense is “deeply rooted” in Second Amendment jurisprudence,
but it remains an “unstable and contested” concept.149 The doctrine
does not define against whom self-defense may be directed, how
defense may be pursued, or how far the right extends.150 Inherent
within self-defense, however, are other, potentially more workable,
theories articulated by private militias.
2. Safety
Personal protection and safety are natural theories of the Second
Amendment motivating private militia groups. Militias often extend these theories to include public safety, thereby granting them
the right to carry arms in public spaces to protect their neighborhoods and communities.151 According to one popular saying, “an
armed society is a polite society.”152 Proponents of this theory can
analogize to the First Amendment’s “marketplace of ideas” rationale
in arguing that the government “does not possess a monopoly” on a
“marketplace of violence.”153
However, those on the other side of the argument can point to the
deaths of protestors in Kenosha or the many recent mass school
shootings to show that the presence of guns in public has done more
harm than good.154 As the Court noted in Heller, laws prohibiting
146. See Eric Ruben, An Unstable Core: Self-Defense and the Second Amendment, 108
CALIF. L. REV. 63, 66 (2020).
147. See id.
148. Id. at 67.
149. BLOCHER & MILLER, supra note 43, at 153-54 (quoting McDonald v. City of Chicago,
561 U.S. 742, 768 (2010)).
150. See id. at 152.
151. See id. at 155.
152. Id. (citing ROBERT A. HEINLEIN, BEYOND THIS HORIZON 228 (Baen Books 2002) (1942)).
153. Id.
154. See Yablon, supra note 20.
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possession of weapons in “sensitive places such as schools and government buildings” do not violate the Second Amendment.155 Courts
have held parking lots, polling places, and other locations to be
“sensitive places” where guns may be regulated.156 Thus, it would
appear that any theory of safety has not been found to authorize
possession wherever and whenever armed militias seek to carry
guns.
3. Anti-Tyranny
The anti-tyranny theory of the Second Amendment is rooted in
the early militias of the Colonial Era.157 Fears of a standing army
and the monarchy drove colonists to form their own armed forces;
these same fears are reflected in the modern anti-government
movement among private militia groups.158 This theory also invokes
federalism concepts, as the Second Amendment is viewed as a “limitation on federal power,” granting the states and the people a check
on the government.159 Another subset of the anti-tyranny theory
posits that the right to bear arms protects minorities from police
brutality and exposes systemic problems while holding officers accountable.160 This argument is particularly salient today as African
Americans are continually subjected to systemic violence, often at
the hands of the police and armed private actors.161

155. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008).
156. Timothy Zick, Arming Public Protests, 104 IOWA L. REV. 223, 260 (2018). For a more
thorough discussion on the “sensitive places” doctrine, see id.
157. See BLOCHER & MILLER, supra note 43, at 165.
158. See Antigovernment Movement, supra note 37.
159. Douglas Walker, Jr., Necessary to the Security of Free States: The Second Amendment
as the Auxiliary Right of Federalism, 56 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 365, 367 (2016).
160. See SpearIt, Firepower to the People! Gun Rights & the Law of Self-Defense to Curb
Police Misconduct, 85 TENN. L. REV. 189, 190-91 (2017).
161. See Ebony Slaughter-Johnson, ‘Stand Your Ground’ Laws Encourage Dangerous
Vigilantism, INST. FOR POL’Y STUD. (Sept. 5, 2018), https://ips-dc.org/stand-your-ground-lawsencourage-dangerous-vigilantism/ [https://perma.cc/9RUT-WA9J].
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4. Autonomy
Another theory of the Second Amendment that private militia
groups rely on is autonomy, or the idea of “self-rule.”162 Under this
theory, individuals have the right to control their own bodies, decisions, and actions without restriction.163 A person’s choice to carry
an assault weapon in public should trump all other considerations
because he is “his own master.”164 However, court decisions, including Heller itself, place significant limitations on the scope of the
right to bear arms.165 Thus, even if autonomy is accepted as a
rational justification for the individual right to bear arms, courts
and policymakers have not found any compelling reason to allow
completely unrestricted possession.
5. Collective Defense Outside of the Home
Militias often also draw on an extended theory of self-defense to
argue not only that defense is needed outside of the home, but also
that groups have a right to defend themselves and their communities collectively. Collective defense is certainly embodied in the
Second Amendment in the language “[a] well-regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State.”166 However, courts
have interpreted the “militia” to encompass the formal armed forces
and official militia, as well as “all able-bodied men.”167 Thus, private
militia groups gathering while armed in public would appear to fall
outside of this definition and Second Amendment protection.
Professor Darrell A. H. Miller notes that Heller “did not foreclose
some level of collective right in addition to a personal right”168 and

162. See BLOCHER & MILLER, supra note 43, at 160.
163. See id.
164. Id. (citing the classical theory of John Locke).
165. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626-27 (2008) (discussing categories
not protected by the Second Amendment).
166. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
167. Heller, 554 U.S. at 596.
168. Darrell A. H. Miller, Guns, Inc.: Citizens United, McDonald, and the Future of Corporate Constitutional Rights, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 887, 937 (2011).
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suggests that a corporation could argue for a collective right to arm
itself.169 A private militia could argue that it operates as a corporation and also has a right to provide collective defense by arming
itself, via its members, in public. As the next Part will show, however, existing laws regulating the presence of armed militias in
public are constitutional and non-violative of the Second Amendment’s right to keep and bear arms.
III. STATE ANTI-MILITIA LAWS: THE CATEGORIES AND THEIR
CONSTITUTIONALITY
Although Heller established a fundamental individual right to
keep and bear arms, that Second Amendment right is not absolute.170 Following Heller, courts have upheld most constitutional
challenges to gun laws, with little expansion of the right’s scope
beyond lawful self-defense in the home.171 The government can
regularly show a substantial interest in public safety to restrict
possession, particularly of assault weapons, outside of the home.172
Especially in the context of private militias, the government has
a variety of tools to limit the potential harms of armed gatherings
in public. Prosecutors have used several federal provisions to limit
militia activity. For example, in United States v. Huff, the defendant, who was associated with a private militia group that planned
to “take back” Madisonville, Tennessee, was convicted of violating
a federal law that criminalizes transporting a firearm “knowing or
having reason to know ... that [it would] be used unlawfully in
furtherance of a civil disorder.”173 In that case, the Sixth Circuit held
that the law did not violate the Second Amendment, which does not
“protect the right of citizens to carry arms for any sort of confrontation.”174
169. Id. at 891-92.
170. See Timothy Zick, The Second Amendment as a Fundamental Right, 46 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 621, 626 (2019).
171. See supra Part II.B.
172. See, e.g., Kolbe v. Hogan, 849 F.3d 114, 146 (4th Cir. 2017).
173. 630 F. App’x 471, 475-76 (6th Cir. 2015) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 231(a)(2)).
174. Id. at 487 (quoting District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 595 (2008)). Other
federal laws have also been used to regulate private militia activities. See Conaway, supra
note 52, at 1453 (noting that federal anti-conspiracy laws could be applied to border
vigilantes, who operate in a similar fashion to private militias).
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The focus of this Note, and this Part in particular, is on statelevel anti-militia laws. In a 2020 report, Georgetown University
Law Center’s Institute for Constitutional Advocacy and Protection
catalogued existing provisions in all fifty states that can be used to
prevent private armies from gathering at public rallies.175 Section A
assesses examples of the four general categories of state anti-militia
laws identified in the report. Section B then analyzes these provisions under Heller, arguing that they are constitutional and fit
within the existing framework used to assess Second Amendment
challenges.
A. Categories of Existing State Anti-Militia Provisions
States currently have four main avenues by which they can
regulate private militia groups: (1) constitutional subordination
clauses; (2) false assumption statutes; (3) anti-paramilitary activity
statutes; and (4) statutes prohibiting armed gatherings.176 This Note
focuses on the provisions states can use to directly regulate armed
militia gatherings, so the first three categories will receive less attention than the fourth. This Section briefly reviews examples of
each category in turn.
1. Constitutional Subordination Clauses
Forty-eight states have constitutional clauses that place the military under civil authority.177 For example, Article I, Section 13 of
the Virginia Constitution reads: “in all cases the military should be
under strict subordination to, and governed by, the civil power.”178
Important to note in this sample provision is the use of the word
“military.” While armed private militias may think of themselves as
members of the military, they are unofficial and not state sanctioned.179

175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

See PROHIBITING PRIVATE ARMIES, supra note 17, at 1.
Id. at 2.
Id. at 4.
VA. CONST. art. I, § 13.
See Hansen, supra note 9.
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2. False Assumption Statutes
Seventeen states have false assumption statutes, which restrict
civilians from acting as police officers or members of the armed
forces.180 These statutes take two common forms. The first bars false
assumption of the duties of an officer: “Any person who falsely assumes or exercises the functions ... [of a] peace officer ... is guilty of
a Class 1 misdemeanor.”181 The second regulates the wearing of
military uniforms: “No person shall wear ... a uniform so similar as
to be easily mistaken [for an officer].”182 Not all militias wear misleading uniforms or act as police officers; nevertheless, several
groups have sought to assume police duties at public protests, as
seen in Kenosha, and some have even been welcomed by law enforcement.183
3. Anti-Paramilitary Activity Laws
A third category of anti-militia laws includes statutes that criminalize paramilitary activity, such as instructing others how to use
firearms and explosives.184 At least twenty-five states have such
statutes.185 A key to these provisions is the intent that such paramilitary training will be directed toward committing a “civil disorder.”186 This “behind-the-scenes” training activity can rear its ugly
head when militia members later choose to bear and use their weapons in public.187
4. Statutes Prohibiting Armed Gatherings
Twenty-nine states have statutes that prohibit private militias
from gathering in public without state authorization.188 Alabama’s
180. PROHIBITING PRIVATE ARMIES, supra note 17, at 7.
181. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-174 (2021).
182. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 26-170(A) (2021).
183. See Shortell et al., supra note 7; Hvistendahl & Brown, supra note 72.
184. PROHIBITING PRIVATE ARMIES, supra note 17, at 6.
185. Id.
186. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-9-120(2) (2021).
187. Cf. Witsil, supra note 5 (discussing the training activity of militia members who plotted to kidnap Governor Whitmer).
188. PROHIBITING PRIVATE ARMIES, supra note 17, at 5.
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statute serves as the model for this Note’s proposed standard: “Any
two or more persons ... who associate, assemble, or congregate
together ... or otherwise take up or bear arms in any such capacity
without authority of the Governor [shall face conviction].”189 This
statute, representative of those adopted by other states, encompasses a variety of groups, as long as two or more members gather
with arms in public.190 As the Institute for Constitutional Advocacy
and Protection report states, “self-designated private militia organizations attend[ing] public rallies purportedly to keep the peace ...
likely fit within this type of prohibition.”191 Part IV argues that all
states should adopt laws modeled on the Alabama provision, with
heightened penalties for those convicted.192 But first, this Note will
assess the constitutionality of the laws currently in force.
B. The Constitutionality of State Regulation of Private Militias
Despite the arguments of private militia members and gun rights
activists to the contrary, state laws regulating armed gatherings in
public are constitutional under both the Second and First Amendments.
1. Second Amendment Constitutionality of Anti-Militia Laws
The existing state-level tools available to regulate private militia
groups, particularly those laws restricting armed gatherings, do not
violate the Second Amendment. In fact, in the 1886 case Presser v.
Illinois, the Supreme Court held that a state law restricting the
parading of a private militia in public was not unconstitutional and
did not infringe upon the Second Amendment right to bear arms.193
Justice Scalia made explicit reference to Presser in his Heller opinion, noting that the Second Amendment “does not prevent the prohibition of private paramilitary organizations.”194 Later, in Vietnamese Fishermen’s Ass’n v. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, the District
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.

ALA. CODE § 31-2-125 (2021).
See id.
PROHIBITING PRIVATE ARMIES, supra note 17, at 5.
See infra Part IV.A.
116 U.S. 252, 264-65 (1886).
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 621 (2008).
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Court for the Southern District of Texas upheld a state law prohibiting private military training.195 In that case, members of the KKK,
who also were part of the Texas Emergency Reserve militia, argued
unsuccessfully that the Second Amendment protected the right to
bear arms as a group.196 As Eric Tirschwell and Alla Lefkowitz have
noted, the prohibitions in these cases “are exactly the type of laws
that [Heller] reaffirmed as permissible.”197
Prior to Heller, states could regulate private militias based on the
militia-oriented reading of the Second Amendment granting authority to regulate the possession of arms as it related to the militia.198 Following Heller’s interpretation of the Second Amendment
as granting an individual right to bear arms, the analysis of state
laws regulating private militias now focuses on the two-part framework adopted by lower courts.199 First, courts determine whether the
law burdens conduct covered by the Second Amendment.200 Assuming private militia members are not ex-felons or mentally ill— uncovered categories according to Heller—and the weapons are “in
common use,” state militia laws likely do burden covered conduct.201
However, even if state anti-militia provisions regulate conduct
covered by the Second Amendment, courts must determine the
appropriate level of scrutiny to apply—strict scrutiny for core
exercises of the right or intermediate scrutiny for non-core conduct.202 Self-defense in the home requires the application of strict
scrutiny.203 In contrast, courts should apply intermediate scrutiny
for armed public gatherings because such gatherings simply do not
implicate the same privacy and self-defense concerns raised in protecting one’s own home. Under intermediate scrutiny, the government can easily demonstrate its substantial interest in public
195. 543 F. Supp. 198, 219-20 (S.D. Tex. 1982).
196. Id. at 210.
197. Eric Tirschwell & Alla Lefkowitz, Prohibiting Guns at Public Demonstrations:
Debunking First and Second Amendment Myths After Charlottesville, 65 UCLA L. REV.
DISCOURSE 172, 180 (2018) (footnote omitted).
198. See Polesky, supra note 54, at 1594-95; BLOCHER & MILLER, supra note 43, at 60.
199. See, e.g., Kolbe v. Hogan, 849 F.3d 114, 146 (4th Cir. 2017).
200. See BLOCHER & MILLER, supra note 43, at 110.
201. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 625-27 (2008) (quoting United States
v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 179 (1939)).
202. See Zick, supra note 156, at 236.
203. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 628-29.
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safety.204 State provisions prohibiting armed militia gatherings are
substantially related to an interest in public safety, as demonstrated by recent acts of intimidation and violence committed by
armed actors at public protests.205 Removing armed gatherings from
the streets can help de-escalate tensions and the potential for
violence.206
Furthermore, these regulations do not burden any more conduct
than necessary, as militia members are still free to (1) privately
gather while armed in their own homes, (2) publicly gather while
unarmed, and (3) individually carry arms in states and settings
where such conduct is legal.207 Despite private militias’ arguments
to the contrary, the Constitution and case law do not support an
unrestricted right to assemble with arms in public.208 For example,
following violence at the 2017 “Unite the Right” rally in Charlottesville, a suit successfully applied Virginia’s anti-militia laws
to bar twenty-three militia members from returning to the city in
armed groups of two or more.209 Furthermore, forty-four states have
laws allowing individual open carry of long guns in public, undermining the claims that bans on armed militia gatherings are too
broad and infringe on the Second Amendment right to bear arms.210
2. First Amendment Constitutionality of Anti-Militia Laws
Although extensive analysis of the First Amendment is beyond
the scope of this Note, it is nonetheless important to address
constitutional claims that state anti-militia provisions infringe upon
the freedoms of speech, association, and assembly. Some argue that
restrictions on militia gatherings violate the freedom of speech
because many militia groups are engaging in political speech by

204. See BLOCHER & MILLER, supra note 43, at 110.
205. See Shortell et al., supra note 7; Hvistendahl & Brown, supra note 72.
206. See Shortell et al., supra note 7.
207. See Ellen M. Bowden & Morris S. Dees, An Ounce of Prevention: The Constitutionality
of State Anti-Militia Laws, 32 GONZ. L. REV. 523, 530 (1996).
208. See James M. Vaché & Mark Edward DeForrest, Truth or Consequences: The Jurisprudential Errors of the Militant Far-Right, 32 GONZ. L. REV. 593, 620 (1996).
209. Shortell et al., supra note 7.
210. Id.
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expressing their anti-government stances.211 However, anti-militia
laws do not prevent groups from gathering to express their unique
political beliefs; rather, the provisions restrict the carrying of
weapons in public while gathered in a group.212 Additionally, even
if armed gatherings in public are considered expressive “symbolic
speech,” states can use content-neutral regulations that are tailored
to serve a substantial government interest.213 Governments can
demonstrate a significant interest in public safety for which the law
is neutrally applied to all armed groups, regardless of their political
views or beliefs.214
Others argue that anti-militia provisions violate the First Amendment rights of groups to associate with like-minded individuals and
to assemble in public.215 However, as noted above, laws regulating
armed gatherings are not categorical restrictions on the rights to
assemble and associate.216 Militia groups can assemble in public, as
long as they are not armed.217 Militia members are free to associate
with one another, either unarmed in public or armed in the privacy
of their homes.218 Court decisions, from Presser in 1886 up through
the recent Charlottesville suit, reflect interpretations of anti-militia
provisions as non-violative of the First Amendment.219
Open carry laws that allow the public bearing of long guns are not
the focus of this Note, but the overlap between private militias, open
carry, and First Amendment rights merits brief discussion.220 Some
have argued that open carry laws chill the First Amendment right
to speech of protestors, who face intimidation or violence when an
211. See Louren Oliveros, Comment, Sacrificing People, Protecting Hate: An Analysis of
Anti-Militia Statutes and the Incitement to Violence Exception to Freedom of Speech as Legal
Protections for Members of Groups Targeted by Hate-Motivated Violence, 30 N.M. L. REV. 253,
267 (2000).
212. See id. at 267-68.
213. See Zick, supra note 156, at 231; United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968).
214. See Zick, supra note 156, at 231.
215. See Larizza, supra note 38, at 584.
216. See Bowden & Dees, supra note 207, at 530.
217. See id.
218. See id.
219. See id. at 530-31 (quoting Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 267 (1886)); Shortell et al.,
supra note 7.
220. For more thorough analysis of open carry laws and public protests, see Zick, supra
note 156, and Gregory P. Magarian, Conflicting Reports: When Gun Rights Threaten Free
Speech, 83 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 169 (2020).
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armed individual appears at a public protest.221 Similarly, the
gathering of an armed militia at a public protest can chill speech,
creating a clash of First and Second Amendment rights.222 As
mentioned above, restrictions on armed public gatherings meet the
standard of intermediate scrutiny, serving the government’s substantial interest in public safety.223 Thus, in a battle between a
protestor’s right to free speech and a militia member’s right to
bear arms, the protestor should win because public safety and deescalation of the potential for violence call for reasonable restrictions on the Second Amendment.224 Simply put, a protestor’s life and
well-being are more fundamental constitutional rights than the
right to gather in public as part of an armed private militia.225
IV. A PROPOSAL FOR REGULATING ARMED PRIVATE MILITIAS IN
PUBLIC
States can use anti-militia provisions to regulate private militia
gatherings in public without violating the Constitution, and they
should do so to protect the safety of their citizens. So why have
states rarely utilized the tools available at their disposal?226 This
Part seeks to answer that question, while providing a workable and
effective alternative to existing state anti-militia laws. First, Section
A proposes a universal, consistent standard that all states should
adopt in order to regulate armed private militia gatherings in
public. Then, Section B addresses practical challenges that states
will face in enforcing this proposed standard. Finally, Section C
rebuts common counterarguments that private militias and gun
rights activists may rely on in opposition to the proposal.

221. See Magarian, supra note 220, at 173.
222. See id.
223. See BLOCHER & MILLER, supra note 43, at 110.
224. See Thomas B. McAffee, Constitutional Limits on Regulating Private Militia Groups,
58 MONT. L. REV. 45, 77-78 (1997).
225. See id.
226. See Yablon, supra note 20.
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A. Regulating Private Militias: Applying a Universal State
Standard to Ban Armed Gatherings in Public
Although all fifty states have at least one provision that can
regulate armed private militias, these laws are rarely utilized.227
States can more effectively regulate armed groups and promote
public safety by adopting a universal standard that applies consistently in each state. This proposed standard adopts the language of
Alabama’s law banning armed militia gatherings in public:
Any two or more persons, whether with or without uniform, who
associate, assemble, or congregate together by or under any
name in a military capacity for the purpose of drilling, parading,
or marching at any time or place or otherwise take up or bear
arms in any such capacity without authority of the Governor,
must, on conviction, be fined.228

Additionally, this Note’s proposed standard calls for enhanced penalties for conviction, up to a $5,000 fine, five years in prison, or
both.229 These heightened penalties will increase deterrence, providing laws with more bite when enforced.230 Depending on the severity of the case and the armed group’s specific actions, a court can
vary the applicable fine and jail time within the statutory range.
Enacting this proposed statute consistently across all fifty states,
rather than at the federal level, will allow states to be responsive to
the local needs of their communities. While some cases will inevitably receive national headlines and recognition, prosecutions can
be handled locally to reinforce a state’s commitment to safety and
its willingness to root out local threats to citizens.231 Under the language of this proposed standard, a variety of armed actors could be
considered “private militia” groups for the purposes of regulation.
For example, the “with or without uniform” language allows equal
227. See id.
228. ALA. CODE § 31-2-125 (2021).
229. The Alabama statute from which this proposal’s language is drawn calls only for up
to a $1,000 fine, an amount commonly seen in other state statutes. See id.
230. See Rathod, supra note 28.
231. Cf. Shortell et al., supra note 7 (discussing Wisconsin provisions that could be used
to prohibit the Kenosha Guard and other private armed actors from gathering at public
protests).
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application of the provision to any armed group, not just those who
parade in uniform or seek to assume law enforcement duties.232
Additionally, while the standard specifically lists “drilling, parading, or marching” as prohibited conduct, it also includes “tak[ing]
up or bear[ing] arms in any such capacity.”233 This phrasing covers
any armed appearance of a militia in public, regardless of how formal the group’s organization or activity may be. As long as two or
more individuals gather “by or under any name” of a militia group
in public while bearing weapons, they are subject to regulation.234
Militia groups may raise objections to the “associate, assemble, or
congregate” language as violating their First Amendment rights.235
However, the rights to assemble in public or associate with a group
are not categorically restricted by this proposed standard; rather,
groups are only limited when they gather while armed in public
settings.236 The law would not prohibit groups from gathering unarmed in public or armed in their homes, placing only those restrictions on the First Amendment rights necessary to protect public
safety.237 Furthermore, by including the phrase “without authority
of the Governor,” this standard recognizes that ultimate control over
any militia gathering rests with the government.238 Of course, statesanctioned militias, such as the National Guard, could be authorized
to gather armed in public.239 And there may be other regulated
scenarios in which a governor might allow a group—such as the
Knights of Columbus—to parade while armed. Thus, this proposed
standard restricts only unofficial armed gatherings of groups that
may threaten public safety.
Notably, this Note’s proposed law does not include a mens rea
requirement for conviction. The standard does not require that
armed militia members who gather in public intend to intimidate

232. See ALA. CODE § 31-2-125.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. See supra Part III.B.2.
236. See Bowden & Dees, supra note 207, at 530.
237. See id.
238. See, e.g., VA. CONST. art. I, § 13 (subordinating the military under the control of civil
power).
239. See Golden, supra note 9, at 1023.
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protestors or cause violence.240 As demonstrated by the countless incidents of escalating tensions and even lethal violence at protests,
merely showing up in an armed group poses a substantial threat to
public safety.241 States should have the flexibility to respond to
threats and hold perpetrators of violence and intimidation accountable. This Note’s proposed standard, built primarily on the language
of preexisting provisions that pass constitutional muster, grants
states such power to effectively limit the impact of private militias.
Applying this standard to one of the recent appearances of armed
private militias at public protests, the Kenosha Guard could be
prosecuted for its activities during the racial justice protests following Jacob Blake’s shooting.242 Members found to have gathered
in a group of two or more while armed at the public protest, under
the name of the Kenosha Guard and without authority of Wisconsin’s governor, could face prosecution. While the Proud Boys group
does not necessarily operate or identify as an armed private militia,
if members appear together armed in public to intimidate protestors, they could also face regulation.243 The same would apply to
armed militia members who gathered to storm the Capitol on January 6, with the caveat that the District of Columbia is not a state
and therefore would need to apply the standard under an analogous
city provision.244 An individual’s right to keep and bear arms merits
constitutional protection, but when that right conflicts with an
individual’s rights to life and safety, it must be subordinated. State
governments have a duty to adopt and consistently apply laws that
de-escalate tensions while promoting public safety.

240. Cf. Zick, supra note 156, at 256 (discussing that some laws regulating paramilitary
activity require “the purpose or intent of furthering civil disorder”).
241. See Are Citizen Militias Legal?, NPR (Aug. 30, 2020, 5:20 PM), https://www.npr.org/
2020/08/30/907720068/are-citizen-militias-legal [https://perma.cc/K48P-W8MC].
242. See Shortell et al., supra note 7. Although Kyle Rittenhouse was not a member of the
militia group, he could face prosecution under a domestic terrorism statute, such as 18 U.S.C.
§ 2331. The Kenosha Guard’s armed activity during the protests is believed to have emboldened Rittenhouse’s actions. See id.
243. See Levy & Ailworth, supra note 6.
244. See Goldman et al., supra note 3.
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B. Practical Challenges to Regulating Private Militias
In order to successfully implement this Note’s proposed regulation
of private militias, states will need to overcome several practical
challenges. The primary challenge to implementation is overcoming
the lack of political will that has prevented regulation of armed
militias under existing state provisions.245 States have “wide latitude” to regulate groups gathering with weapons in public, with
state anti-militia laws chief among the tools at their disposal.246
Nevertheless, these provisions are rarely utilized, with some states
likely afraid “to do anything that could be perceived as an attack on
gun rights.”247 Additionally, some provisions are ambiguous, leaving
states wary of applying laws with little precedent.248 Thus, due to
these concerns—fears of being perceived as too restrictive of the
right to bear arms, with few cases to rely on for support—many
militia groups have avoided charges.249
This Note’s standard seeks to provide guidance by clearly defining
what qualifies as a private militia and when such a group may be
regulated while armed in public.250 By increasing the allowable
consequence for a conviction—up to a $5,000 fine and up to five
years in jail—this proposal gives the provisions much-needed teeth
that may encourage states to act more forcefully.251 Of course this
proposal alone cannot compel states to charge armed groups.
However, a clear and consistent standard applied evenly in all fifty
states may result in more charges, thereby fostering political
courage in states that previously may have feared to regulate the
gun rights of militias.252
Political polarization is another practical challenge facing states
seeking to regulate private militia groups. One of the core tenets
of the modern private militia movement, which rose to greater

245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.

See Yablon, supra note 20.
See Tirschwell & Lefkowitz, supra note 197, at 189.
Yablon, supra note 20.
See id.
See Shortell et al., supra note 7.
See supra Part IV.A.
Rathod, supra note 28.
See Yablon, supra note 20.
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notoriety in the 1990s, was a strict anti-government perspective.253
Drawing on the anti-tyranny and autonomy theories of the Second
Amendment, many of these initial militia groups argued that the
government had no right to regulate their weapons, and some even
engaged in outright insurrection.254
While the movement has always featured right-wing beliefs and
talking points, today several militias have now explicitly aligned
with right-wing politicians.255 As many commentators have noted,
the election of former President Donald Trump was a driving factor
behind this shift.256 As the reaction of the Proud Boys to President
Trump’s “stand back and stand by” comments suggested, many
groups feel emboldened and called to action by political rhetoric.257
Therefore, related to the challenge of political will, many states also
may fear enforcing laws that could be perceived as encroaching on
the free speech of militia groups. However, this Note’s proposed
standard regulates only armed gatherings in public that threaten
civilian safety. Groups are still free to gather armed in their homes
or unarmed in public to express their views.258
The tacit support provided by law enforcement officers to private
militia groups raises yet another challenge for states seeking to
regulate armed gatherings.259 For example, at the protests in Kenosha following the shooting of Jacob Blake, some officers “were
seen giving apparent militia members water and thanking them.”260
While these acts alone do not suggest that all police condone the
actions of all private militias, they are suggestive of a troubling
entwinement between official law enforcement actors and unofficial
armed groups.261 This alignment blurs the lines between legal and
253. See Hansen, supra note 9.
254. See id. (discussing the government standoffs at Ruby Ridge and Waco in the early
1990s).
255. See id.
256. E.g., id.
257. Levy & Ailworth, supra note 6.
258. See supra Parts III.B, IV.A.
259. See Shortell et al., supra note 7; Hvistendahl & Brown, supra note 72 (“The United
States has a long history of vigilantes working with police and government officials .... One
prominent group, the Oath Keepers, is made up of current and former military and law
enforcement members.”).
260. Shortell et al., supra note 7.
261. See id.
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extralegal actions and could further complicate state responses to
militia gatherings in public. This Note’s proposed standard cannot
unravel all of the connections between police and unofficial armed
actors. Nevertheless, the standard’s clear definition of a “private
militia” can and should be applied in all cases, regardless of whether
an individual police officer expressed support for an armed militia
member during a tense protest.262
C. Rebutting Counterarguments to the Proposed Standard
In addition to the practical challenges associated with implementation, this Note’s proposed standard also is likely to generate
several counterarguments. The main counterargument— that state
anti-militia laws are unconstitutional and violate the Second
Amendment’s right to keep and bear arms for self-defense—is
addressed in detail in Part III.B.1. In rebuttal to these claims, there
have been several court orders in recent years enforcing state
statutes that restrict armed gatherings in public.263 Additionally,
self-defense as a legal right requires the elements of necessity and
proportionality, and it is a stretch to claim that these elements are
met when one gathers with other armed individuals in public.264
Armed private militias cannot claim necessity and a right to selfdefense when they create the tensions and threats to public safety
by inserting lethal weapons into a public setting.265
As addressed above, this Note’s proposed standard also does
not violate the First Amendment because private militia groups
maintain their First Amendment rights to assembly and association.266 The standard regulates only armed gatherings in public to
protect the substantial government interest in safety, while allowing private gatherings or unarmed public gatherings.267 Further,

262. This Note cannot, and does not, seek to provide solutions for reforming the police system. However, structural changes are needed to address harmful law enforcement practices,
including alignment with extremist, armed right-wing militia groups.
263. See PROHIBITING PRIVATE ARMIES, supra note 17, at 1 (discussing the successful suit
barring armed groups from gathering in Charlottesville).
264. See Ruben, supra note 146, at 66-67.
265. See Shortell et al., supra note 7.
266. See supra Part III.B.2.
267. See Bowden & Dees, supra note 207, at 530.
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depending on state open carry provisions, individual members may
even be allowed to bear arms in public, as long as they do not gather
with other armed members.268
Some critics may argue that this Note’s proposed standard is too
narrow, targeting gatherings of two or more but leaving individual
armed actors unregulated and free to threaten public safety. Under
this argument, critics can point to “lone wolf” shooters, such as Kyle
Rittenhouse in Kenosha or Dylann Roof in Charleston, who would
avoid prosecution under the statute.269 This argument is not without
merit, as the “leaderless resistance” model embodied by “lone wolf”
mass shooters has become all too common in recent years.270
Nevertheless, additional measures, such as domestic terrorism statutes, exist to prosecute individual armed actors.271 While this Note
advocates for the prosecution of these individual domestic terrorists,
its standard is limited to armed group gatherings that pose the
greatest threats to public safety. By focusing solely on armed
groups, the proposed statute avoids potential challenges associated
with proving that an individual is a member of a specific group and
therefore should face prosecution.272
Another counterargument is that identifying which private
militia groups conducted an armed gathering in a large public
protest crowd can be a seemingly impossible task. With hundreds or
thousands of individuals gathered in a protest setting, it may be
incredibly difficult to isolate militia groups as separate entities.273
Nevertheless, many militia groups use forms of self-identification—for example, a uniform, label, or card—that could ease this
evidentiary challenge.274 Some militias cluster together in groups
of several members at a protest, making identification easier.275
Additionally, in today’s digital age, law enforcement investigations

See Shortell et al., supra note 7.
See Yablon, supra note 20.
Id.
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2331; see also Declare Rittenhouse What He Is--A Terrorist,
MUSLIM PUB. AFFS. COUNCIL (Aug. 28, 2020), https://www.mpac.org/blog/statements-press/
declare-rittenhouse-what-he-is-a-terrorist.php [https://perma.cc/LG2X-N4LP].
272. See Zick, supra note 156, at 256.
273. See id.
274. See id.
275. See Hansen, supra note 9.
268.
269.
270.
271.
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and online searches may also reveal details about militia membership.276
Relatedly, a rational concern about the proposed standard is that
enforcement could potentially drive armed actors further underground to avoid detection.277 While this concern is legitimate, states
must respond to as many potential threats to public safety as
possible. This Note’s proposal increases states’ leverage to prosecute
groups who appear armed in public, and law enforcement investigations can be utilized as needed to further pursue those groups that
seek to escape regulation.
A final compelling counterargument is that protestors, particularly minorities, should be able to arm themselves in light of the
historical pervasiveness of police brutality.278 According to this argument, armed protestors can hold officers and law enforcement
systems accountable by lawfully possessing guns and preventing the
state from “possess[ing] a monopoly” on weapons.279 This counterargument holds merit, particularly given the numerous killings of
unarmed African Americans by police officers.280 However, a categorical ban on the public gathering of armed private groups, regardless of race, political affiliation, or beliefs, will de-escalate
tensions and promote public safety.281 In states where it is legal to
bear weapons in public, individuals are allowed to lawfully carry a
gun for self-defense; only armed groups gathering together in public
fall under the standard’s proscription.
CONCLUSION
States have tools at their disposal to regulate armed private militias that pose threats to public safety. However, for a variety of reasons, including a lack of political will and perceptions that these
276. See Shortell et al., supra note 7 (discussing the Kenosha Guard’s Facebook pages).
277. See Oliveros, supra note 211, at 274.
278. See SpearIt, supra note 160, at 190-91.
279. See BLOCHER & MILLER, supra note 43, at 155; see also SpearIt, supra note 160, at 19091.
280. Cf. Cheryl W. Thompson, Fatal Police Shootings of Unarmed Black People Reveal
Troubling Patterns, NPR (Jan. 25, 2021, 5:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/2021/01/25/9561770
21/fatal-police-shootings-of-unarmed-black-people-reveal-troubling-patterns [https://perma.
cc/7HWH-Y55X].
281. See Shortell et al., supra note 7.
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laws lack any meaningful bite, states have been reluctant to rein in
armed militias. This Note’s proposed statute would replace existing
provisions by applying a clear and consistent standard that would
allow all fifty states to overcome these practical challenges and
effectively regulate dangerous armed gatherings in public settings.
State anti-militia provisions naturally implicate the Second
Amendment by regulating the ability of private militia groups to
bear arms in public.282 Since the Supreme Court’s landmark holding
in Heller that the Second Amendment protects an individual right
to bear arms, militia groups have been emboldened to argue that
this right extends to public spaces.283 However, lower courts, applying a two-step framework, have rarely chosen to expand the
Amendment’s scope and have upheld existing provisions that
prohibit armed gatherings.284 These holdings suggest that the arguments of gun lobbyists and private militias are unpersuasive.285
Thus, this Note’s proposed standard, which is based on Alabama’s
current anti-militia provision, would pass constitutional muster
without infringing on the post-Heller Second Amendment right.286
As scholars have noted, “the core holding of Heller is politically
and legally secure.”287 Claims that the Second Amendment is being
treated as a “second class right” are overblown and ignore the slow
historical development of other constitutional rights.288 The death
of Justice Ginsburg and the subsequent confirmation of Justice
Barrett, which entrenched a firm conservative majority on the Supreme Court, signal the possibility of future expansion of the Second
Amendment right.289 In its current term, the Court will hear its first
major Second Amendment case since 2010.290 Regardless of if and
how the Court may expand the right to bear arms, states have the

282. See Vietnamese Fishermen’s Ass’n v. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, 543 F. Supp. 198,
210 (S.D. Tex. 1982).
283. See Tirschwell & Lefkowitz, supra note 197, at 189.
284. See PROHIBITING PRIVATE ARMIES, supra note 17, at 1 (describing the upholding of
Virginia’s anti-militia statute after the violence in Charlottesville in August 2017).
285. Tirschwell & Frassetto, supra note 24.
286. See ALA. CODE § 31-2-125 (2021).
287. BLOCHER & MILLER, supra note 43, at 177.
288. Id. at 183; see also Zick, supra note 170, at 627.
289. See Johnson, supra note 135.
290. See de Vogue & Cole, supra note 136.
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capacity to regulate dangerous armed private militia gatherings
right now.
As the world watched in horror on January 6, 2021, several
armed militia members participated in a mob that struck at one of
the central seats of American democracy. Emboldened by political
and social changes, private militias have become an all-too-common
presence in the twenty-first century, with the capacity to do severe
and lasting damage. Quite simply, states owe a duty to their citizens
to minimize the threats posed by these armed actors.
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